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1. 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This paper discusses aspects of the development of water supply and sewerage 
services over recent years in three Bolivian centres, La Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba, and 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The paper seeks to clarify some misunderstandings on 
performance but does not delve deeply into the technical detail, which others have 
already documented. An attempt is made to put the businesses in a wide context and 
thereby suggest some issues for future research. The information used in the paper 
comes from a variety of sources: the public domain, official sources that are not 
generally available or released, contract documents and reports that have limited or 
restricted access, direct contact by the author, and some is anecdotal. 
 
These centres are considered significant as they represent very different levels of 
Bolivian society and highlight the disparate nature of this landlocked nation. Over 
1,500,000 people live in both La Paz/El Alto and in Santa Cruz, and around 500,000 
in Cochabamba. They comprise about a third of the country’s population of 
8,000,000. This paper contemplates how these centers are different, and investigates 
the origins of their successes and failures. In the case, of Cochabamba, we wonder 
how matters are proceeding after the dramatic failure of the water concession, such as 
the Vivendi/Tucumán and Azurix BA/Province of Buenos Aires contracts, and how 
people are getting on after the crisis. The paper also addresses the businesses that 
regulate the sector (Superintendencia de Aguas) and the umbrella regulator of utilities 
(Superintendencia General, Sistema de Regulación Sectoral – SIRESE), and the 
impact of national and international norms on local realities. 
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2. 
 
General 
 
 
Bolivia is a land of ancient peoples, a product of Spanish imperial rule, and a modern 
exploiter of natural mineral and agricultural resources. In 1650, the city of Potosí, 
based on a massive silver mine at some 4000m above sea level, had a population of 
160,000 at a time when Argentina’s Buenos Aires, whose urban sprawl is now around 
12 million, had not reached yet 20,000 (El Saneamiento en el Área Metropolitana 
2000 by Osvaldo Rey). Another, anecdotal, source suggests that Potosí had a 
population closer to 500,000, making it an immense centre for that time, even though 
only 170,000 people live there now. 
 
La Paz, the relatively wealthy capital founded in 1548 that is 3,600m above sea level 
and lies on the silver route, is in the shadow of the high Andean plain and famously 
sprawls below the poorer conurbation of El Alto. Water resources are not considered 
to be a serious problem. Cochabamba lies in the fertile Central Valley at around 
2,600m and has serious groundwater depletion and potentially expensive surface 
water. Santa Cruz de la Sierra (founded in 1561) lies on the great Brazilian llanos 
plain at a mere 400m above sea level. There is extensive groundwater exploitation and 
the upper aquifer is polluted, but boreholes 500 metres deep should maintain supplies 
for the medium term. Deeper wells or surface water capture are possibilities for the 
long term, but extended services and the mining of deep resources will have to be 
dealt with. 
 
With almost perverse pride, Bolivians boast of the loss of some 1.1 million km² of 
their 2.4 million km² pre-revolutionary territory to bordering states. They now feel the 
loss of sea access for gas products and, symbolically wearing potpie hats, lament the 
deaths caused. The indigenous Guaraní people remain in a state of war with the 
Kingdom of Spain (Homero Carvalho Oliva – Countenances and Souls from Eastern 
Bolivia by Roger Ortíz Mercado 1999). Recent presidents have been bilingual, but in 
Indian and English, not Spanish, and provincial governors have mixed English with 
Spanish in a bewildering way. Understanding and language are not unimportant in 
terms of selling ideas to the population and involving them successfully in delivering 
the services. 
 
Water privatisation, visited on the regional water authorities in England and Wales in 
1989, was not attempted in Scotland. The technical and business cases were very 
nearly the same and subsequent Scottish investment has faced special problems, but it 
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was the cultural battle that was too much even for Mrs Thatcher, then prime minister 
of Britain. Dwr Cymru/Welsh Water publishes most of its principle documents in 
English and Welsh, and other English water sector companies publish at least some 
information in widely used minority languages to capture their customers. Bolivia, 
then, with reported high illiteracy (UNFPA, The State of World Population – 2001), 
may be in as great a need of indigenous language translation as of general language 
skills and the jargon of service sectors. In addition until such literacy is reached 
alternative communication strategies, such as using the radio may be considered. 
 
In common with most of the developing world, Bolivia faces extreme population 
growth, somewhat disguised by percentage treatment (2.2% per annum – UNFPA) but 
representing an increase in absolute numbers from a current 8.5 million to 17 million 
by 2050. (These projections, which influence future asset requirements and can cause 
investment despair, need to be treated with caution; while data is not fully available 
yet, a recent census indicates that population increases were lower than expected.) 
With an urban population of around 5.4 million and a global trend of urbanisation, 
demand for managed water supply and sewerage systems is pressing and will become 
more severe. An annual GDP/PPP of US$1,010/US$2,193 (1999 – Selected World 
Development Indicators, World Development Report 2000/2001) means that simple 
extrapolation of international norms and solutions will be neither appropriate nor 
affordable. More important, perhaps, there is little likelihood of those norms being 
achieved unless great strides can be made in wealth creation and people are 
discouraged from drifting into poor urban areas. These are tall orders indeed and 
require some high-level pragmatism to deliver affordable but controllable systems that 
will last and can be financed.  
 
A start may be made by lowering a key driver – the per capita demand assumption. 
This is generally about 200 litres per head per day in South America and is enshrined 
in laws that fly in the face of water conservation and moderation in infrastructure 
investment. The relevant laws, often described as national, are really applicable only 
to urban water use. In Bolivia’s case, the ‘Reglamento Nacional de Prestación de 
Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado para Centros Urbanos’ correctly addresses 
urban populations. While doing less than they might for the spread of managed 
services, such instruments prop up excessive, legally enforceable solutions and scare 
off investors from planning more moderate systems. Western European demand is 
now managed at 100 to 150 l/h/d, home storage is flattening out demand peaking, new 
petrochemical materials offer lower friction and perhaps insulation properties that 
could influence pipe diameters and cover. Important capital cost savings can be had 
by using less ambitious designs, macro metering down to the 1000 property frontier, 
and more careful construction might be explored and implemented. On the matter of 
excessive demand prediction, there is a lesson from history, doubtless repeated 
elsewhere. In his Water to Tyneside, R.W. Rennison reports the steady increase in 
demand of the commercial, industrial, and growing population of Newcastle’s (UK) 
urban sprawl. In 1861 demand was estimated at some 90 litres, per head per day. By 
1931 the estimated use had risen to 136 l/h/d, and leapt to 227 l/h/d by 1950 and 281 
l/h/d by 1979. Whether Rennison’s figures included averaged out commercial and 
industrial use as well as domestic demand is not clear, but there is little doubt that the 
post second world war figures included substantial and increasing losses from ageing 
infrastructure deterioration.  
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Current use in the Newcastle area is of the order of 146 l/h/d (England and Wales 
average 149 l/h/d – OFWAT Leakage and the efficient use of water 2000-2002 
Report) and is adequate to support a modern society. Much developing world 
planning (Bolivia aims for 200 l/h/d to 250 l/h/d according to its regulations) 
continues to use demand horizons that have origins in figures that include important, 
reducible losses and that drive investment to perhaps ill-timed resource exploitation 
and treatment. Having said that, meeting the unsatisfied demand for water supply and 
sewerage to even an acceptable base position remains a formidable problem. For 
Santa Cruz average domestic demand of around 113 l/h/d has been reported, but this 
conflicts with the year 2000 official figures tables given later in the text. In El Alto 
new connections are using around 45 l/h/d, a figure believed to be driven by a cultural 
reserve in water use. These figures suggest that average demand figures of 200 l/h/d 
to 250 l/h/d need to be investigated. 
 6 
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3. 
 
Sector arrangements 
 
 
According to the SIRESE Report on “La Regulación Sectorial en Bolivia, 1998’ 
published in December 2000, water supply and sewerage services were provided in 
Bolivia by eight principal autonomous/semi-autonomous suppliers, 23 municipal 
companies, and co-operatives serving populations in excess of 10,000 people and 
others serving populations of up to 10,000. There are also isolated rural communities 
using quasi-natural circumstances (untreated surface water and wells) and finally 
some ad hoc illegal urban or semi-urban arrangements. There is, as previously noted, 
a water sector regulator, a Superintendencia de Aguas created in 1997 under the 1994 
SIRESE law which introduced regulation of the water, electricity, hydrocarbons, 
telecommunications, and basic transportation industries (SIRESE Report, 1998). As 
was clear in this frank report, relations have run anything but smoothly in some areas. 
Troublesome as the issues may be, as a non-sanitised offering, the document provides 
useful information from which to understand progress. 
 
Formal water sector providers were, in 1988, localised monopolies, vertically 
integrated but influenced by real and projected bulk transfer schemes not under their 
mandate. The companies SEMAPA (Cochabamba), ELAPAS (Sucre), AAPOS 
(Potosí) and SELA (Oruro), COSSALT (Tarija), COSMOL (Montero), SAGUAPAC 
(Santa Cruz de la Sierra) and COATRI (Trinidad) are municipal or co-operative 
organisations providing water and sewerage services to mainly urban populations. 
Additionally Aguas del Illimani (owned mainly by the Suez Ondeo Group – formerly 
Lyonnaise des Eaux – delivers services to La Paz/El Alto under the only international 
concession in operation. (The company is named after Bolivia’s highest mountain, the 
triple-peaked Mount Illimani, whose highest peak, Pico Sur, is 6,462m (21,200ft). 
The contract was let in 1997. Another concession, for SEMAPA’s activities in 
Cochabamba and won by International Water in 1999 following a previous, abortive 
move towards privatisation in 1997, collapsed within six months of handover. The 
newly created concessionaire, Aguas de Tunari, was reportedly expelled, 
(International Water Association, Water 21 report – June 2000) having been engaged 
on what some of us considered a doomed mission. The other main agency involved in 
providing the services is the Ministry of Housing and Urban Matters. 
 
Both public and private operators come under the SIRESE Law Nº1600, but as of the 
end of 2000 we were still waiting for the enactment of a draft regulatory decree to 
deliver a new Water Law. The Water Law of 1906 provided a sufficient platform for 
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creating a contemporary regulatory framework (‘Report on the legal feasibility of 
private sector participation {PSP}’ in Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado, 
SEMAPA Cochabamba by Ashurst Morris Crisp – March 1996). The regulatory 
decree project was a comprehensive work and was commented on by the author of 
this paper. The decree covered in depth the general aspects of the decree; institutional 
aspects for the sector, concessions, and other authorising instruments for providing 
services; regulation of the services, non-compliances and sanctions; charges and 
tariffs; use of publicly owned assets in service provision; and rights of access for 
operations and works. The document ran to over 243 clauses, and even if it remains 
trapped in a web of opposition is an important reference work. 
 
Areas where evolving regulatory experience in both the UK and other South 
American countries would suggest some review and further development were as 
follows: (These follow the order of the draft rather than suggest particular priorities.) 
 
 Some restrictions on participation may not be practical. Some provisions would 
limit the potential for economies from innovative solutions. 
 The replacement of regulators every five years is probably incompatible with the 
long-term planning needed by the services and the need for continuity. 
 There was merit in combining regulation of distinct services but it was worthwhile 
maintaining separate information sets and activity-specific data. 
 The regulations appeared to be orientated towards criminal sanctions for service 
failure rather than to customer compensation. 
 There was a need to accept some realities in free movement of shares and to 
consider customer and employee ownership. 
 Conflict could result from having multiple agencies – at that stage understood to 
be the Secretaria Nacional de Aguas and the Superintendencia Sectorial de Agua – 
without clearly defining their roles. 
 Water pressures, sewer cleaning, and management of industrial effluents needed 
some further definition. 
 The treatment of guarantees and relationships with construction rather than service 
performance, and the lost investment potential caused by ‘back to back’ risk 
transfer between lenders and contractors, could reduce investment potential and 
cause double indemnities. 
 The continued involvement of providers with some relief after a disaster was 
preferable to allowing them to escape their contract because of the disaster. 
 Customers should be protected from intrusion when public rights are transferred 
to private companies and be able to contact any appropriate authority. 
 The treatment and economics of macro and micro metering, and the value of water 
as numbers of customers not served or as an absolute (rather than percentage) loss, 
needs to be considered. 
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 The provision of information and limits on confidentiality to neutralise 
asymmetric bias in favour of monopoly suppliers needs consideration. 
 The use of multiple parameters for assessing service coverage to permit a 
reasonable view to be taken of progress was desirable. 
 There should be obligations on providers to collect revenues due but with 
limitations on draconian rights over customers’ property. 
 Others’ experience in facing difficulties with imposing connection charges should 
influence tariff structures. 
 Orienting the arrangements such that the customer is recognised as the client and 
the state as the facilitator (rather than customer) required a cultural adjustment. 
 Inclusion of levels of service and CAPEX/OPEX detail in a generic law could 
cause regulatory and practical difficulties. 
 Concerns were raised (perhaps prophetic considering Argentina’s fiscal problems) 
about the risks associated with financing locally paid services with international 
funds. 
 
As reported by the Superintendencia de Aguas in SIRES 1998, a primary difficulty 
was the lack of the regulatory legislation, compounded by the unhealthy but 
apparently effective resistance of water supply and sewerage operators via their 
national trade organisation, ANESAPA (Asociación Nacional de Empresas de 
Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado), to payment of regulatory fees. The 
fallout from those circumstances were doubts about the shape of the legislation to be 
provided, the inability of the regulator to deal with some matters referred to it, an 
inability to finance regulatory staff recruitment, and the publication of only Aguas del 
Illimani’s data. As shown by SAGUAPAC’s Memorias Anuales, of which copies can 
be obtained up to the end of 1999, other organisations’ performances are published 
and can be analysed. The lack of standardised, verified information is not helpful 
when the sector needs to exploit comparability, and promote efficiency and clarity to 
encourage investment and long-term interest. 
 
It is understood that after a hiccup over forms of contract, setting of regulatory fees, 
and operators’ targets, most of the substantial service providers have now signed up to 
concession arrangements. Certainly for year 2000, regulatory data is available and 
some of the information is provided here. 
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Indicators year 
2000 
Units AISA Aguas 
del Illimani 
SAGUAPAC 
Santa Cruz 
SELA 
Oruru 
COSMOL ELAPAS 
Sucre 
COATRI 
Trinidad 
CAPAG 
Debt Recovery % 116.80 97.00 58.02 96.00 92.65 69.00 96.00 
Customer 
complains satisfied 
% 94 100 100 100 97 100 (*) 
Measured tariff 
(1US$=6Bs) 
Bols/m3  2.86 3.01 2.47 2.72 3.89 3.14 1.78 
Technical         
Coverage water 
supply 
% 98.25 94.00 82.75 91.00 81.77 50.37 94.00 
Coverage sewerage % 74.76 41.00 (**) 22.60 69.51 (**) (**) 
Measured supply 
coverage 
% 90.04 98.00 39.91 100.00 100.00 33.05 100.00 
Continuity of service % 99.74 99.76 37.51 100.00 98.70 (*) 100.00 
Potable water 
losses 
% 27.56 24.00 41.28 (*) 23.80 52.91 (*) 
Water use Litres/head/d
ay 
126 163 118 91 122 168 42 
Administrative         
Internal manning 
levels - water supply 
Emp/1000 
connections 
1.80 3.60 5.92 5.26 6.56 9.00 4.86 
Internal manning 
levels - sewerage 
(***) 
Emp/1000 
connections 
2.87 8.86 (**) 22.22 7.72 (**) (**) 
Combined services Emp/1000 
connections 
1.11 2.53 (**) 4.25 3.69 (**) (**) 
Source: After SIRESE 2000 service delivery tables  
(*) Data not available 
(**) Sewerage services not provided 
(***) Work contracted to third parties excluded 
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4. 
 
SAMAPA and SEMAPA – Targets for  
private sector involvement 
 
 
As major centres needing investment and, potentially, private sector management, 
water supply and sewerage services for La Paz/El Alto (SAMAPA) and Cochabamba 
(SEMAPA) became targets for operational privatisation no later than 1996. A World 
Bank mission investigated the options for PSP. At that time consultants were deeply 
involved in a Cochabamba study to identify a privatised programme for the Central 
Valley. By then Cochabamba had enjoyed – or suffered, depending on one’s 
perspective – a master plan (SEURECA-BRGM-SOGREAH-CGL in 1995), an 
institution strengthening programme, and an investigation into the provision of raw 
water from a new dam – the Misicuni scheme – at a disproportionate estimated cost 
approaching US$1 billion. Subsequent planned phasing projected a six-year 
construction first stage costing some US$470 million. An alternative supply from the 
Corani hydroelectric project appeared to be more immediately feasible but practically 
impossible to deliver in the short term due to requirements to construct raw water and 
potable water bulk transfer tunnels, mains, and treatment works. Again subsequent 
planning has suggested a three-year construction programme delivering a bulk 
transfer system. Contract terms proposed by the power concessionaire were severely 
biased in his favour and, though not unreasonable from his point of view, were 
extremely onerous for SEMAPA and almost certain to lead to default. In reporting to 
the Bank, I noted that the Corani proposed water supply terms were ‘chillingly 
simplistic’. By June 1999 an agreement was reportedly reached whereby water could 
have been supplied from Corani at a manageable price of around US$0.30 per m3. 
 
The consultants set out the range of PSP options and the requirements for modelling 
privatisation scenarios, highlighting the many difficulties being faced and in prospect 
for SEMAPA. They made recommendations on tariffs and on modelling future 
revenues and costs. What conclusions they drew on the viability of the options are not 
readily available but it is possible that they closed the financial/economic envelope 
with revenue increases that were unachievable. Signs from the English and Welsh 
water sectors and the Aguas Argentinas concession were already suggesting that high 
infrastructure charges for expansion and substantial annual price increases were 
precarious tools for boosting revenue. Not only did they make customers unhappy, but 
had become cannon fodder for a hostile press and political opportunists. 
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SEMAPA’s water resources problems, piled on top of the normal list of deficiencies 
usually expected to be solved by introducing PSP, gave little confidence that the 
privatisation exercise would be successful. SAMAPA’s situation and empathy with 
PSP change suggested that it would be possible to use private sector involvement at 
the water service level to improve quality and expand coverage. It was the author’s 
view at the time (1996) – and little in the sector indicates otherwise – that SEMAPA’s 
circumstances, where large strategic assets were required to avoid catastrophic 
depletion of natural resources, that local sector-specific solutions were unlikely to be 
successful. Still less was the private sector willing to invest without specific 
guarantees and payment periods that are compatible with short to medium-term 
financing. Acceptable tariffs will not be adequate to meet OPEX and CAPEX needs. 
The financial/economic necessities are undeliverable and both internal cross subsidy 
and mechanisms to spread capital costs over asset lives are essential to make step 
changes to the base position. 
 
Nevertheless, both SAMAPA and SEMAPA were put up for privatisation under a 
mandate with an organisation late in 1996. In parallel, another consultants (out of 
Buenos Aires) commenced modelling techno-financial/economic scenarios for the 
two businesses. The issue of information memoranda early in 1997 to companies and 
organisations interested in participating in the tender process triggered the process. 
Information contained in information memoranda is normally provided under strict 
confidentiality rules both to protect valuable client data from general disclosure but 
also to ring-fence the bidding process. The process here was no exception, but later 
reporting suggests that while the structures of the bids and following contracts would 
be similar, (the legal framework and centralised source of bidding would promote 
that), the priorities were different, the winning parameters distinct, and the business 
environments were critically favourable in one case and hostile in the other. 
 
For La Paz/El Alto, expanding the of water supply and sewerage coverage were the 
key drivers and bids were based on extension of coverage. As noted previously, 
exploitation of water resources was not a critical matter.  
 
For Cochabamba, the lowest tariff offer would decide who won the contract, but the 
winning number would still be a double-digit rise in tariff at transfer. Probably 
essential to support CAPEX in water resources, such an increase faced possible severe 
customer resistance. As it turned out, the 1997 bid process did not produce a 
concession. A view expressed to the author is that delivering water from Corani under 
the 1997 proposal could have produced a manageable tariff increase. However 
insistence on the Misicuni scheme and the effects of bringing tariff information up to 
date under the Aguas de Tunari contract generated percentage changes approaching 
200% for some customers – a time bomb. 
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5. 
 
SAMAPA 
 
 
SAMAPA was successfully transferred to the purpose-made company Aguas del 
Illimani in 1997 and is the only company reported on in the SIRESE 1998 report. The 
Company is owned by ONDEO (54%), the Bolivian Investment Corporation (22%), 
Invesora en Servicios (9%), the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, 
CONNAL S.A. (5%), and staff (2%). Information extracted from the report and 
rounded indicates the following. 
 
Coverage 1997 1998 Rate of Increase 
La Paz (%) (%) (%) 
Water supply coverage 89 95 7 
Sewerage coverage 73 74 3 
El Alto (%) (%) (%) 
Water supply coverage 77 82 7 
Sewerage coverage 36 40 11 
Expansion of services Programmed Delivered Against target 
La Paz August 97/December 98 nº nº (%) Over target 
Water supply      new connections 4,700 6,100 30 
Sewerage            new connections 2,300 2,600 29 
El Alto August 97/December 98 nº nº (%) Over target 
Water supply      new connections 17,900 23,100 29 
Sewerage            new connections 10,700 14,400 34 
Source: SIRESE/Aguas del Illimani – Regulatory report on 1998  
 
The report also notes that tariff levels were maintained at constant dollar prices of 
between US$0.22/m3 and US$1.18/m³ for domestic supply, between US$0.66/m3 and 
US$1.18/m³ for commercial, and at US$1.18/m³ for industrial. Bills were raised in 
Bolivianos at the official exchange rates, however, affording the concessionaire 
inflation or currency protection not afforded to customers. This facility is understood 
to be common to all service suppliers. Tariffs include nominal sums for sewerage. 
 
Comparison of charges is extremely difficult due to exchange rates, PPP rates, 
investment intensity, positions on the expansion and improvement continuum, and 
extent of services provided. However levels do not look like outliers when compared 
to an international set of billing data (note error could be 100% but is not 1000%) but 
they do suggest a strong bias towards subsidy for poorer, low-use customers and the 
commercial/industrial subsidy of domestic supply. A feature of supply uptake is 
understood to be restraint by El Alto customers, who have limited their use to their 
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needs within spending constraints. A consequence of this, of course, is that recovery 
of infrastructure and connection costs based on much higher demand becomes 
problematic. Apart from raising complex issues associated with wealth generation, its 
distribution and social fairness, there is a pressing effect on business modelling and 
technical assumptions. Although different in scale, it is a feature of water supply in 
Britain, for example, that without extensive metering, per capita use has never drifted 
up to the 200 to 300 l/h/d figures typical in the USA and Australia where domestic use 
measurement is extensive, or to the spectacular 400 l/h/d plus evident in Buenos 
Aires, where measurement is rare. El Alto may provide a valuable lesson for 
estimating future demand and an explanation as to why many predictions of water 
shortage doom are not realised. 
 
The regulator reports (from a government paper) capital expenditure of US$317 
million in water supply and basic sanitation over the period 1994 to 1998, and 
investment rising from US$36 million per annum in 1994, US$79 million in 1997, 
and US$82 million in 1998. Of those latter figures, Aguas del Illimani invested some 
US$24 million. It is understood that turnover for the business is less (than US $ 20 
million) so the investment in the first 18 months or so was substantial. The scale of 
investment must also raise a question over the ability of a business of this size to 
command cheap borrowing and enjoy economies of scale in procuring goods and 
services for a relatively low-income industry. Consolidation with higher value 
providers such as gas and electricity or other sector suppliers may be inevitable to 
benefit from scale savings. 
  
There were some 34,000 customer contacts/complaints registered in 1998, 25,000 of 
which were to do with water supply from a customer base of around 140,000 
connections. Most claims related to billing and some (222) were directed straight to 
the regulator. Water quality, both in bacteriological and chemical terms, was reported 
as satisfactory. 
 
The Company published a report ‘Aguas del Illimani 1er Quinquenio’ early in 2002 
and while the water regulator has not necessarily audited the source information it 
indicates that the concession has delivered on expansion and improvements and is 
now pushing beyond the original concession boundaries to include new customers. 
Importantly, those customers are at the lower end of the ability-to-pay scale but, 
quoting the company, face daily water charges seven times lower than a loaf of bread. 
 
According to company figures over the contract period to the end of 2001, water 
supply coverage in La Paz and El Alto has reached 100% of the contractual target 
involving respectively 20,800 and 43,500 new connections while sewerage has risen 
respectively to 88% (14,500 new connections) and 54% (29,800 new connections). 
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6. 
 
SEMAPA 
 
 
In an editorial from the Los Tiempo.Com website on 24 February 2002, it was 
reported that ‘La ligereza con que Semapa se propone echar por la borda un crédito de 
18 millones de dólares, lo que privaría a Cochabamba de la única fuente de 
financiamiento para paliar la escasez de agua potable, supera el límite de lo tolerable. 
Es necesario evitar que la Coordinadora aseste un nuevo golpe a nuestra región’. (The 
ease with which SEMAPA proposes to throw overboard a US$18 million credit, 
which would have provided the only funding to reduce our water shortages, is beyond 
what is tolerable. It is necessary to avoid the Coordinator {this may be the coalition 
for the defence of water and life, for which see below} firing another blow at our 
region. BW translation) 
 
The IWA’s Water 21 reported on the collapse of the short-lived Aguas de Tunari 
concession late in 2000. A web search shows this event to have been much more than 
a contract breakdown, calmly worked through by technocrats. It was a very nasty 
affair involving local and international passions, historic ‘rights’, and peasants versus 
the upper classes. There was even a Cochabamba declaration, noble in character, 
global in scope, but light on practicalities, consequences, and the protection of 
customers under properly regulated service provision. Protests in February 2000 
against water charge increases escalated into an extended and deadly skirmish 
between protesters and the police and military. Interests as diverse as coca growers 
from 280km away (not directly affected by the concession presumably) and truckers 
(potentially much more challenged by piped water supplies replacing tankers) were 
represented on the field of conflict and at subsequent strikes over official violence. It 
may be educational to know how much water infrastructure this battle would have 
financed.  
 
The upshot of all this was that the government reverted to water tariffs pre-
privatisation modified by the Coordinadora, exited itself from the agreement with 
Aguas de Tunari, and devolved de facto control of SEMAPA to the ‘Coordinadora de 
Defensa del Agua y de la Vida’, a popular movement. The triggers for contract 
termination were reportedly the public disturbances and non-availability of Aguas de 
Tunari senior management to discuss the situation. At a distance this may seem 
bizarre, but on the frontline the situation was well beyond any recognisable contract 
process. Although there was a flurry of angry correspondence, accusation, and counter 
accusation throughout 2000, some of it harrowing and a far cry from treating and 
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delivering potable water, there has been little on what the Coordinadora and 
SEMAPA have since achieved in meeting demand and standards. Many of their 
vociferous backers seem to have drifted away, although a January 2001 report from 
Maude Barlow, National Volunteer Chairperson for a group called The Council of 
Canadians suggested a need for practical solutions in the everyday and less heady 
business of delivering sustainable services. Matters were to be discussed at a 
conference on ‘Water for People and Nature: A Forum on Conservation and Human 
Rights in Vancouver, July 5-8, 2001’. While assistance may have been provided, 
website conference notes do not confirm what practical measures have been put in 
place.  
 
SEMAPA, with a customer base of more than 500,000 people, should be a rather neat 
water business but is beset by difficulties, unable to satisfy those it serves under 
whatever structure. Turnover at around US$4 million in 1995 was set against 
operating costs of over US$6 million (including depreciation of around US$2 
million). Increased revenues as a result of a 30% price hike in 1996 would have 
pushed billings to over US$6 million. Further increases, some abandoned after the 
1999 revolt against privatisation, would have strengthened revenue so long as they 
were actually collected, but collection rates in 1996 were not very encouraging. 
Opposition to further price rises may have worsened the debt position. Gleaned 
features of SEMAPA’s progress suggest that structural problems may continue to dog 
the services and raise the following questions: 
 
 Does migration to Cochabamba continues to stress an overloaded system? 
 Are the poverty of new urban dwellers and their resistance/desperation hitting 
potential revenues and involvement of sustainable assistance? 
 Successful means to mobilise Corani or Misicuni raw water resources have not 
been put in place. The Corani option may no longer be available, so what now are 
raw water supply solutions? 
 Has consolidation of municipalities to generate benefits of scale taken place in 
accordance with Supreme Decree Nº 24298 of May 1996? 
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7. 
 
SAGUAPAC 
 
 
The Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos – ‘Santa Cruz’ Ltda (SAUAPAC) is a co-
operative organisation that provides water supply and sewerage services to the central 
zone and northern and southern parts of the city. It operates out of an open plan 
headquarters and appears to be a transparent and tightly run business conscious of its 
duties to its customers-cum-owners. Senior management has few illusions about 
economic realities. Service bills project that understanding to customers noting among 
other matters that: 
 
 A monthly bill will be delivered to a client and in his/her absence returned to HQ 
from whence the client shall request and settle the account. 
 Where bills are not settled or collected and settled they will fall as debts for 
rebilling with the next account. 
 Bills are issued around the same date each month, hence customers should expect 
them. 
 Supply will be cut off in five days following failure to settle outstanding sums 
(although this facility is reported not to be used). 
 
SAGUAPAC publishes a bimonthly news sheet (SAGUAPAC Informa) and annual 
reports including summarised accounts and an Auditor’s short report (Memória Anual 
1999 and Price Waterhouse Coopers audit statement of 14 April 2000). The 1999 
figures give a turnover of Bols.101.4 million, direct operating costs of Bols.45.8 
million, administration costs of Bols.49.7 million, and other costs including financial 
charges, amortisation of assets, inflation provisions and other non-operational costs 
totalling Bols5.8 million, leaving a marginal surplus of Bols0.1 million for that year 
(less than 1% of costs). Restated figures from the same report for 1998 indicate a 
turnover of Bols.89.6 million, costs of Bols90.2 million and a negative residual of 
Bols0.6 millions, a deficit of 7% of costs. These results are as expected, the Co-
operative being required to balance its books annually. 
 
The Bimonthly sheet of December 2000 advised consumers that average per capita 
use ranged from 80 to 100 l/h/d and carried a strong message about water 
conservation and the nature of losses. Information on expansion of sewerage services, 
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including contract price, funding provisions, and projected works was provided as 
well as some global perspectives of the water sector. The Cooperative also published 
a graph of a November/December 2000 opinion poll by independent marketing 
consultants MKT and PAT (Periodistas Asociados de Televisión) on how customers 
view SAGUAPAC. In an OFWAT/ONCC (England and Wales) document  
‘Understanding Customers’ Views’ of October 2001, views of customers on a range 
of issues were reported. Figures from the two studies are compared below. The design 
of the MKT/PAC sampling and analysis is not known and SAGUAPAC, facing an 
important expansion programme, may be subject to greater opportunity for complaint 
than UK companies. 
 
Overall satisfaction (per sample survey)  E&W water 
2001 
E&W sewerage 
2001 
SAGUAPAC 
2000 
Very satisfied 50% 51% 4% 
Satisfied N/A N/A 50% 
Fairly satisfied 40% 40% N/A 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 6% 6% 5% 
Fairly dissatisfied 3% 2% N/A 
Dissatisfied N/A N/A 19% 
Very dissatisfied 1% 1% 6% 
 
A simple comparison indicates that while satisfaction is less than that in the UK, more 
than 50% of SAGUAPAC’s customers are satisfied with the services they receive. 
 
In August of 1999, SAGUAPAC, signed a 40-year concession contact with the 
Superindendencia de Saneamiento Básico, thereby regularising itself within the 
national regulated water and sewerage framework. 
 
SAGUAPAC is known to be expanding its services in response to customer demand 
and has carried out a strategic planning exercise to 2039. Details are not on general 
release but the plan will have to confront incorporation of less well-off customers and 
an estimated threefold increase in population served. Interim issues to be dealt with 
will be capturing funding, the genuine interests of casual water suppliers as the supply 
borders are pushed out, and perhaps radical thinking on revenues and CAPEX/OPEX 
if per capita demand can be contained at 100 l/h/d or less. 
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8. 
 
Conclusions, observations and lessons 
 
 
Bolivia’s water supply and sewerage services face formidable problems in extending 
coverage to a growing and mobile population. While major funding is and will be 
required, project scale will be an impediment to low-cost private sector funding. 
Conversely managing demand and containing per capita use may generate projects 
that can be bundled or financed via revenue surpluses. 
 
Experience in the sector as a whole shows variable but real progress in delivering a 
regulated service and including public and private suppliers in comparative 
competition. 
 
For the three centres discussed, perhaps the widest spectrum of outcomes has been 
exposed. These range from the successful transformation of La Paz/El Alto SAMAPA 
services to a PSP operation, the continued calm development of Santa Cruz services 
under SAUGAPAC, and the stormy path of Cochabamba and uncertainty about how 
SEMAPA is performing. 
 
What lessons seem to be apparent? A first generalisation might be the need to 
establish the availability of and access to information so that needs and possibilities 
are transparent. This paper was produced to clarify a perception that the SAMAPA 
concession had not delivered on expansion of services. That perception does not now 
appear to have been reasonable and the concession is looking beyond initial targets to 
include those outside the regulated areas. A second generalisation is that whereas 
information on SAMAPA and SEMAPA was relatively easy to track down, current 
information on SEMAPA seems to be scant, and hence the conclusions drawn here 
are subject to possible asymmetric bias. Some bullet points follow: 
 
 A hard lesson is that if a great deal of the available energy is set against change 
then failure is assured. To overcome that, it would appear to be an essential pre-
project activity to advise all stakeholders of the options, the likely outcomes of 
their actions, and the responses of others to those actions. If there were profound 
stakeholder opposition and little intent to fulfil obligations (a classic and frequent 
circumstance being of public bodies not paying their service charges) then it 
would be better for the PPP concept not to proceed. Those opposed can then face 
up to delivering by themselves and divert their energy to that end. 
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 An equally important matter is to set realistic but tough targets that are achievable, 
giving the changed organisation the chance but no easy ride to deliver. The basket 
of required changes should not be so extensive as to render some early success 
practically impossible. For instance, identifying operational improvements, 
initiating training, and establishing customer relations may deliver early gains for 
customers, providers, and public promoters while a desired, undeliverable in the 
short-term, capital programme will not. 
 There seems to be ample evidence that increasing charges to the relatively poor 
(normally the charging pressure is upwards where expansion and achieving basic 
quality standards are fundamentals) in advance of delivering benefits is untenable 
and explosive. Promoting cross subsidy however should not be feared and should 
be exploited. Boosting revenue from those who can and will pay will improve 
cash flow and financial borrowing credibility. 
 The Bolivian cases and more mature systems where wealth is not a particular 
problem all indicate a need for review of demand figures, most probably resulting 
in a downward adjustment and consequently less capital investment needed and 
possibilities for sweating existing assets. More controversially perhaps, there 
should be a pragmatic approach to quality improvement so that the desire to 
leapfrog stages of more mature systems sits realistically within the financing 
model. 
 Targets need to be defined that match the business profile and do not have show-
stopping externalities. Building a US$600 million dam on the back of a gross 
US$10 million annual turnover water supply business is not a concession with 
some capital works but a capital project with some operations. Understanding the 
shape of the business is important and failing to understand financial relationships, 
ratios, and covenants imposed on borrowing as well as the physical attributes of 
the services will generate an unachievable project. 
 Finally, and returning to energy, the public promoting team needs to be 
sufficiently extensive, briefed, and supported to carry through the metamorphosis 
stage of the change exercise. The regulatory body needs to be set up and trained in 
what will likely be a new and much longer relationship between promoter 
(government agency or ministry), service provider, and customers. 
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